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HARNESSING HYDROCARBON REVENUES: REFLECTIONS ON RUSSIA
Economies, like Russia, blessed with resource abundance, do not usually perform well during the 
period of commodity price boom. Th e optimal policy of managing resource revenues prescribes to 
commit the permanent income rule to smooth the resource dividend in effi  ciency units and to smooth 
the real exchange rate. During the commodity price boom, Russia followed partially this prescribed 
policy, but the situation changed aft er the crash of oil and gas prices in 2014. Possible ways to over-
come the consequences of low oil and gas prices are discussed, paying particular attention to the lack 
of economic complexity and the need for diversifi cation and capabilities for growth and development 
of the Russian economy. Refs 29. Figs 3.
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ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ ДОХОДОВ ОТ УГЛЕВОДОРОДОВ: РАЗМЫШЛЕНИЯ О РОССИИ
Экономики стран, богатых ресурсами, к которым относится и Россия, зачастую оказыва-
ются неэффективными в период бума цен на сырьевые товары. Оптимальная политика управ-
ления ресурсными доходами предполагает использование правила постоянного дохода, по-
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зволяющего сгладить колебания ресурсных доходов и реального валютного курса. Во время 
бума цен на сырьевые товары Россия в целом придерживалась этой предписанной политики, 
но ситуация изменилась после падения цен на нефть и газ в 2014 г. В статье обсуждаются воз-
можные пути преодоления последствий низких цен на нефть и газ, особое внимание уделено 
проблеме невысокого уровня экономической сложности, анализируются необходимость ди-
версификации и существующие возможности для роста и развития российской экономики. 
Библиогр. 29 назв. Ил. 3.
Ключевые слова: ресурсное проклятие, управление ресурсными доходами, правило посто-
янного дохода, реальный валютный курс, преодоление низких цен на сырьевые товары, дивер-
сификация, экономическая сложность.
Introduction
Following oil, gas or mineral bonanzas economies oft en do not fare well. Th e reasons 
for this so-called natural resource curse are by now well known (e. g., [Guriev and Sonin, 
2008]). First, appreciation of the real exchange rate and the decline in non-resource exports 
depress growth as the traded sectors like the export industries are the engines of economic 
growth, not the non-traded sectors such as construction, services, and government. 
Th is is what is sometimes rather ungratefully referred to as the Dutch disease. Second, 
the notorious volatility of oil, gas and commodity prices wrecks economies, especially 
if fi nancial markets are underdeveloped. It is diffi  cult to plan ahead and to disentangle 
changes in the real and nominal cost of production factors. Due to these mistakes output is 
less than what it would be otherwise. Furthermore, volatility of such an important revenue 
stream makes it more likely that countries are credit constrained and cannot fi nance 
crucial innovations which will hamper growth projects. Clearly, these negative eff ects are 
particularly severe if the banking sector is not well developed and fi rms are unable to 
hedge against this type of uncertainty. Th ird, it has been established in many developing 
countries that large income from selling oil and gas revenue has led to rent seeking by 
the political elite and to worsening of institutions but if institutions are good enough this 
occurs much less. Th ere is also a danger that politicians are focused on winning the next 
election and therefore might lose sight of value-for-money policies in order to have a 
result before the election. Th is implies that windfalls are not used in the most effi  cient 
way. For example, there are plenty of examples in developing countries where oil and gas 
revenues has been spent on unproductive prestige investment projects (so-called “white 
elephants”) rather than harnessed for economic growth and development. 
Empirical evidence indicates that the curse is worse if countries have bad institutions, 
the poor rule of law and fragmented fi nancial systems and are ethnically diverse and 
landlocked. Various surveys go into more details on the theoretical and empirical aspects 
of the natural resource curse [van der Ploeg, 2011; Frankel, 2012]. Crucial is to understand 
that the curse is not cast in stone. If institutions, the rule of law and fi nancial markets are 
suffi  ciently well developed and societies are not ethnically fragmented too much, the curse 
can be transformed into a blessing for economic growth and development. 
Section 2 discusses the benchmark advice of how to smooth consumption and the 
real exchange rate in the face of volatile natural resource revenue. Section 3 then off ers 
various reasons why such a permanent income rule may damage growth and development 
especially in developing economies. Section 4 discusses how best to respond to a crash in 
commodity prices. Th e discussion in sections 2, 3 and 4 is based on the analysis of van 
der Ploeg [2016], where further details can be found. Section 5 discusses the experience 
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of Russia before and aft er the commodity price crash, and what reforms including 
diversifi cation and the need to develop capabilities to improve the complexity of the 
economy and boost growth and development of non-gas oil traded sectors are needed. 
Section 6 concludes.
1. Th e permanent income rule for managing resource bonanzas
Th e permanent income hypothesis implies that all generations are given an equal 
increase in consumption in effi  ciency units. Th is so-called resource dividend for each 
citizen thus increases with the trend rate of productivity of the economy. Th is dividend 
is the annuity value of the natural resource revenue and starts as soon as the resource is 
discovered even when the resource is not being mined or the gas is not being pumped yet. 
Th e standard policy advice for managing such windfalls is the permanent income rule. 
Th is requires putting the revenue in an independently managed sovereign wealth fund 
that only invests abroad and smooths the resource dividends over time. Furthermore, this 
policy ensures in an open economy that the real exchange rate is smoothed over time and 
thus sharp swings in the intersectoral allocation of production factors are avoided. Rather 
than having a big temporary contraction in the traded sector and expansion of the non-
traded sector, the policy thus ensures that there is a small permanent contraction of the 
traded and expansion of the non-traded sector. Since the dividend is smoothed over time 
as well, the windfall is thus invested for the benefi t of future and current generations. 
How does this policy work? Upon news of a natural resource windfall, it takes from 
5 to 10 years of exploitation investments before oil or gas can be pumped up1. During this 
period a country should borrow on international capital markets. It also needs to borrow 
abroad to boost consumption. During the windfall revenue from selling natural resources 
pours in, the debt is repaid, assets are accumulated in a fund, and consumption is boosted. 
Once the windfall ceases the country withdraws money from the fund to boost 
consumption and eff ectively acts as a rentier (see fi g. 1). 
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Fig. 1. Profi le of Incremental Assets and Revenue Flow (schematic diagram)
1 According to the data presented in the Lukoil Report the exploitation investments period for Rus-
sia can be much longer in some cases, up to 20  years (URL: http://www.lukoil.ru/FileSystem/PressCen-
ter/81403.pdf (accessed: 20.02. 2017)).
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Th is way of managing an intergenerational sovereign wealth fund ensures a steady 
growth in consumption per capita (the so-called resource dividend) at the rate of trend 
productivity growth before, during and aft er the windfall. Th is strategy makes sense for 
advanced countries blessed with natural resources, but can be disastrous for developing 
countries for various reasons [Venables, 2016; van der Ploeg, 2016].
2. Why smoothing consumption and the real exchange rate may be inappropriate
Th e permanent income rule for smoothing consumption in effi  ciency units and the 
real exchange rate might not be appropriate, especially for many developing economies.
First, to cope with volatile commodity prices countries should engage in prudential 
saving and therefore depress consumption initially to have a stabilization fund, especially 
if countries fi nd it diffi  cult and costly to hedge commodity price risk given the thinness 
of these fi nancial derivatives markets or judge hedging to be politically risky. In contrast 
to the intergenerational fund, such a stabilization fund is larger if the windfall is more 
permanent (e. g., [Bems and De Carvalho Filho, 2011] and [van den Bremer and van 
der Ploeg, 2013]). Norway uses the rather conservative bird-in-hand rule, which puts all 
natural resource revenue in the fund and takes out a constant fraction as a contribution 
to the general government budget (typically 4 % of the fund value). Th e Norwegian policy 
does not use the windfall as collateral and is a pragmatic and prudent way of managing the 
windfall, but leads to substantial consumption volatility as consumption fi rst rises slowly 
as the fund is built up and then declines eventually aft er the windfall as the fund is winded 
down. 
Second, with bad access to international fi nancial markets investment is too low and 
it is better to invest the natural resource bonanzas in the domestic economy (e. g., [van 
der Ploeg and Venables, 2012]). To put it bluntly, the return on investment in education 
of young girls (especially once the benefi ts of postponing the age at which children are 
born is included) is much higher than the rate on US T-bills, especially given the very 
meagre returns at the moment. Th e windfall should also be used to curb capital scarcity, 
and thus accelerate growth and development [van der Ploeg and Venables, 2011]. Th e 
natural resource dividends should be handed out upfront as current generations will be 
poorer than future generations. For example, both post-soviet countries Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan, which dispose of signifi cant hydrocarbon reserves, during 2000–2009  in-
vest substantial amounts of oil revenues into their domestic economies but in a diff erent 
manner. Azerbaijan authorities’ top priority was poverty alleviation and improving the 
living standards. Th e government of Azerbaijan launched various social programs, more 
specifi cally, targeted social assistance program, accompanied with increasing wages and in 
the public sector and raising pensions [van der Ploeg, Kuralbayeva and Venables, 2011]. 
Th ese measures helped to reduce the number of people living below the national poverty 
line from 68 % in 1995 line to 19.6 % in 20062. In contrast to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan had a 
better situation with living standards and invest more than Azerbaijan in domestic non-oil 
sectors to boost the economic growth. 
2 Commission on Growth and Development. 2008. Th e Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained 
Growth and Inclusive Development. Washington, DC. URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/han-
dle/10986/6507 (accessed: 20.02.2017).
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Th ird, developing countries suff er severe absorption constraints in education, health, 
and infrastructure. It takes years before enough teachers, nurses and doctors have been 
trained, and they cannot all be imported from abroad. Also, the more roads and railways 
are in place, the more productive new roads and railways are. Th ese investments are 
mostly produced in non-traded sectors, which are squeezed already by the boost to the 
demand for non-tradables. Th e relative price of non-tradables must thus rise (i. e., the real 
exchange rate must appreciate) for a prolonged period of time to ensure that these parts 
of the economy can slowly expand. With biting absorption constraints it is important to 
set up an investment fund, where natural resource revenue is temporarily parked until 
the supply side of the economy is suffi  ciently strong to absorb the spending effi  ciently on 
education, health and infrastructure [Collier, van der Ploeg, Spence, Venables, 2010].
Fourth, managing natural resource windfalls should take account of the non-neutrality 
of government debt. Timing of handing back the windfall to citizens matters, especially 
in developing countries with poorly developed fi nancial markets. Households prefer 
dividends to be handed back upfront, since they may not be alive to receive them in the far 
future and Ricardian debt neutrality does not hold. Th e permanent income rule then leads 
to overshooting of the real exchange rate and consumption, since households run down 
assets and the current account eventually turns into surplus. Households temporarily get 
more upfront and thus save if the natural resource bonanza is immediately handed to 
them but borrow under the permanent income rule. Households thus have to save more 
if the government fails to smooth withdrawals from the fund. Th is is a direct consequence 
of Ricardian debt neutrality failing to hold, especially in most developing economies. Such 
a case can be observed in Kazakhstan during the period of high oil prices. Motivated 
by expectation of the further rapid growth banking sector launched rapid expansion of 
the fi nancial sector primarily by foreign borrowing. Private sector enjoyed in their turn 
cheap borrowed funds and provoked property bubble, that burst in 2007. Th is also leads to 
costly bail out of banking sector and putting at risk the country’s growth potential [van der 
Ploeg, Kuralbayeva, Venables, 2011]. Partially for these reasons, Aliyev [2013] argues that 
despite robust economic growth in 2000–2008, the eff ect of resource abundance adversely 
aff ects the economic growth in Kazakhstan as there are signifi cant structural, social and 
territorial disparities, low international competitiveness even in commodity markets.
Finally, even though managing natural resource windfalls can be a question of 
decades, it is important to take account of real and nominal wage rigidities and the short-
run eff ects on unemployment. We will discuss this in the next section when considering 
the best response to a commodity price crash. More long-term structural issues and 
needed reforms are discussed in section 4.
3. How to respond to the crash in oil, gas and other commodity prices?
But what to do if oil and commodity prices plummet as has been the case in recent 
years? Would the curse not simply be reversed? Looking at oil- and gas-rich countries 
such as Russia, Algeria, Nigeria, and Brazil their experience during the recent bust is not 
too good either. Th ey have been facing spiralling government defi cits with governments 
having to cut government spending and raise revenue from elsewhere. Preventing 
currency depreciation and the consequent erosion of living standards, requires buying 
up one’s own currency and thus running down foreign reserves until the currency can no 
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longer be defended. If authorities are unlikely, the market may stage a speculative attack 
just before the central bank runs out of foreign reserves. Alternatively, if countries have 
been prudent enough to build up a sovereign wealth fund during the commodity price 
boom, they can dip into their fund to prevent falls in consumption and the real exchange 
rate. Unfortunately, most of these countries have not been so prudent and do not have 
such funds. So if the real exchange rate fi nally sharply depreciates the hope is that Dutch 
disease eff ects turn into reverse and that growth-enhancing, non-resource traded sectors 
of the economy grow while bloated non-traded sectors contract again. Th is is likely to 
occur with signifi cant infl ation costs and erosion of real living standard in the short run 
before the economy has fully adjusted to the new normal of low and sustained commodity 
prices.
If real wages respond sluggishly to unemployment and non-tradables production 
is intensive in structures, a crash in commodity prices causes transient periods of 
unemployment and more so if the whole natural resource bonanza is immediately spent 
instead of the authorities following the permanent income rule or Norwegian’s bird in 
hand rule. Th e reason is that spending the windfall upfront causes sharper depreciations 
of the real exchange rate. Th is can be avoided if part of the windfall is saved. 
If nominal wages are sluggish in the short run, a monetary policy response is required 
to mitigate unemployment and infl ation. Th e well-known and celebrated Taylor policy 
rule raises the nominal interest rate when infl ation is high and unemployment is low. Th is 
rule performs better than a nominal exchange rate peg, especially if the fi scal authorities 
implement a ‘tighten your belt’ rule instead of a permanent income rule. Given that a 
nominal exchange rate peg severely constrains monetary policy’s ability to respond to 
demand shocks including global shocks to commodity prices, it is puzzling that three 
quarters of resource-rich countries still have a nominal exchange rate peg.
If the central bank steps in during a crash in commodity prices to prevent rapid 
nominal depreciation of the currency and infl ation, foreign reserves will be rapidly 
depleted and as mentioned above may eventually lead to a speculative attack on the 
currency. Governments in developing economies may fi nd it tough to cut spending or 
raise non-resource taxes to make up for the drop in resource revenue, even though this 
is needed if the crash is expected to last a long time. Fund wealth is then rapidly depleted 
and government debt escalates until the market is no longer willing to buy more debt. 
Th is myriad of short-run macro misery highlights the importance of sound medium- and 
long-run management of natural resource wealth to cope with the inevitable volatility in 
both natural resource production and commodity prices.
4. Russian experience of managing oil and gas revenues
In many ways the Russian economy is an advanced economy with good access to 
international capital markets. If we also abstract for the time being from the obvious 
absorption constraints facing the Russian economy and the use of gas and oil revenues 
for non-productive purposes, it seems reasonable to argue that a permanent income rule 
is appropriate for Russia. Such a rule should be designed to smooth the real exchange rate 
and to let the oil and gas dividend or the contribution to the general government budget 
per Russian citizen grow at the trend rate of growth of the economy. 
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Malova and van der Ploeg [2016] show that, if the new normal is sustained and the 
world price of oil stays low at $40 per barrel, Russia needs to tighten its fi scal stance by 
4.6%-points of GDP if its adheres to a permanent income rule. Th is requires that the 
government either raises taxes and/or cuts spending by substantial amounts. Furthermore, 
if Russia wants to meet the 2 degrees Celsius global warming commitment agreed on at 
the Paris Summit, it needs to lock up 59 % of its gas reserves and 19 % of its oil reserves 
[McGlade and Ekins, 2015]. Th e consequent drop in oil and gas sales to the rest of the 
world worsens government fi nances and therefore the government needs to tighten its 
fi scal stance by a further 0.9 %-points of Russian GDP. If the commitment is to 1.5 degrees 
Celsius the fi scal stance needs to be tightened even more.
In the remainder of this section we fi rst show in section 4.1 how such a permanent 
income rule compares with what Russia has actually done during the boom in oil and gas 
prices and then show in section 4.2 how Russia reacted to the crash in the world price 
of oil. Section 4.3 then wraps up with a discussion of what Russia can do to diversify its 
economy away from gas and to develop the right type of capabilities to improve economic 
complexity and boost the non-gas, traded sectors of the economy.
4.1. Period of high oil and gas prices 2002–2008
4.1.1. Selected issues of fi scal and monetary policies
At the beginning of 2000, one of the main aims of the Russian government and the 
central bank of Russia was to accumulate foreign reserves and curb existing public debt. 
Anticipating high oil and gas prices in 2002, the government modifi ed and raised the 
taxation of the oil and gas sector. Th e government implemented severance taxes for oil and 
gas production (crude oil, fl ammable gas and gas condensate) and export duties for oil 
and gas selling (oil, gas and goods produced from oil). Before 2002 oil and gas companies 
were taxed independently from the market price of the commodity and thus they were the 
main benefi ciaries of a hike in the word price of oil; and conversely, they would bear all 
risks in case the world price of oil crashes. Reforming the taxation legislation, the Russian 
government linked the tax to the development of oil and gas prices and thus took all 
the benefi ts and risks of commodity price volatility. So when during 2002–2004 oil and 
gas prices rose, the government could use the extra oil and gas revenue for substantial 
public debt reduction (see fi g. 2(b) dark shaded region) as well as the total reserves of the 
country and the net assets grown rapidly (see fi g. 2(a) dark shaded region). Extra oil and 
gas revenues were also used to boost consumption of diff erent groups of citizens through 
the growth in pension benefi ts and salaries in public sector.
However, the significant increase in oil and gas prices led to the appreciation of the 
national currency that forced the central bank in 2004 to change its policy goals. To avoid 
worsening of competitiveness associated with Dutch disease effects, the central bank of 
Russia switched its policy from accumulation of foreign reserves to control over the exchange 
rate. To limit the speculative inflow of cash, the central bank also limited movements in 
the financial account. These restrictions were in force till 2007 [Lomivorotov, 2015].
Despite all the eff orts made by the central bank in stabilizing the nominal exchange 
rate, the real eff ective exchange rate strengthened approximately 1.5  times during the 
period of 2002–2008 (see fi g. 3, dark shaded region) due to the high infl ation rate. As a 
result, there was rapid growth of imports and a slowdown in economic production. 
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FCRF?locations=RU; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PX.REX.REER?locations=RU (accessed: 20.01.2017).
4.1.2. Dealing with extra revenues: funds and domestic investments
The stabilization fund was founded in 2004 to manage the volatile stream of oil and 
gas revenues. Oil and gas revenues exceeding the threshold price (this threshold price has 
changed several times since 2004) were channelled to the stabilization fund. The main 
purpose of the stabilization fund was to accumulate resource revenues so as to cope with 
resource revenue volatility and to make economic development more stable [Kudrin, 
2013]. 
The size of the stabilization fund reached 11.6 % of GDP in 2007 at which time the 
government decided to split up the stabilization fund into two funds: the Reserve Fund 
and the National Wealth Fund3. The Reserve Fund inherited functions of the Stabilization 
Fund and had to cope with volatility in oil and gas revenues while the National Welfare 
Fund was aimed to ensure an equal access to oil and gas wealth for both current and future 
generations. Both funds were replenished properly only in 2008, The National Welfare 
Fund accounted for 3.9 % of GDP that time.
Many domestic investments were made by the government in 2004–2008. A significant 
number of infrastructural projects were launched throughout the whole country from the 
far East to the West: viz. infrastructure for APEC Summit in Vladivostok, the Winter 
Olympic Games in Sochi, the Universiade in Kazan, and transportation projects across 
the whole country.
4.2. How things went wrong during the oil price crash 2008–2015
The global financial crisis of 2008–2009 undermined the hitherto prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies of the Russian government. Because of the pegged nominal exchange 
rate the central bank was forced to defend the local currency by buying local currency and 
3 Ministry of Finance of Russian Federation, Statistical Reports on Reserve Fund. URL: http://minfi n.
ru/ru/perfomance/reservefund/statistics (accessed: 10.01.2017).
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depleting foreign reserves. This led to an 11 % reduction in foreign reserves in 2008 rela-
tive to 2007 (see fig. 2 (a)). In addition to this the government spent approximately 60 % 
of the Reserve Fund’s reserves to finance the budget deficit because of the global financial 
crisis during the period 2009–20114. Furthermore, all subsequent resource revenues of 
2009–2011  were spent on current public needs with nothing saved via the oil and gas 
funds. 
After the global financial crisis, the central bank announced moved from a pegged 
nominal exchange rate to inflation targeting and a flexible exchange rate, since spend-
ing foreign reserves to sustain local currency and exchange rate was no longer seen to be 
sustainable or desirable. As a part of these reforms during the period of 2008–2014, the 
volume of foreign exchange interventions declined. However, the transition process took 
almost 7 years, and the complete shift to inflation targeting happened only in December 
2014 after the crash of oil prices.
After the mitigating the consequences of the global financial crisis in 2010–2011 the 
government, however, did not return to the prudent fiscal policy based on saving part 
of oil and gas revenues. Russia continued to finance the fiscal deficit through resource 
revenues and the non-oil primary deficit has remained relatively large since the global 
financial crisis [IMF (2015)…]. Moreover, starting from 2010 the National Pension Extra 
Budgetary Fund was financed from the National Welfare Fund, while the amounts of fi-
nancial aid were negligible relative to the size of the fund. In 2012–2013 the Reserve Fund 
seemed to recover a bit after the depletion that took place in 2011. However, in 2014 oil 
and gas revenues into the fund ceased because of the government’s need to reduce the 
public deficit which was ballooning due to the geopolitical and economic difficulties of 
2014 and 2015. This situation was exacerbated by the crash in oil and gas prices of 2014. 
Eder [Eder et al., 2015] predicted a consequent fall in Russian GDP in the next few years 
by 4 % to 15 %. However, even in such tough situations it is clear what needs to be done 
in emerging economies that exporters oil and gas, and, in particular, in Russia to make 
a step towards sustainable growth. There are various studies devoted to the resolution 
of this issue particularly for Russia; for instance, the study of the new model of growth 
for Russian economy in the environment of low hydrocarbon prices [Gurvich, Kudrin, 
2015]. Avoiding constructing the model for the whole Russian economy we would like to 
emphasize some important aspects of fiscal and monetary policy recommended for the 
Russian government to cope with this tough situation.
First, it must be realized that relying on oil and gas revenues for financing unsustaina-
ble fiscal deficits is an inappropriate strategy when oil and gas prices have fallen, especially 
when the expectation is that these prices will stay low for many years to come. What is 
needed is to adjust fiscal policy by raising taxes and cutting public spending to make gov-
ernment finances sustainable again. Thus, the main concern is what fiscal policy adjust-
ments are needed. If the current situation continues the government will need to tighten 
fiscal stance significantly to the finance budget deficit, but this decision is not very desir-
able. If a permanent income rule for resource revenue management policy would have 
been implemented fiscal tightening will not be so severe. It has been calculated that in the 
case of a sustained oil price of $40 per barrel and gas price $200 per cubic meter the re-
4 Ministry of Finance of Russian Federation, Statistical Reports on National Welfare Fund for years 
2004–2015, available online: http://minfi n.ru/ru/perfomance/nationalwealthfund/statistics, date of access 
January 2017.
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quired tightening of the fiscal stance is 4.6 %-points of GDP if the permanent income rule 
is implemented [Malova, van der Ploeg, 2016]. Delaying the implementation of this rule 
by a decade implies that the fiscal stance needs to be tightened by a further 0.9 %-points 
of GDP. These findings can be compared with what is needed when the current fiscal 
policy is projected into the future, since then tightening of the fiscal stance to the tune 
of 7 %-points of GDP is required. These results are in line with IMF recommendations 
to Russia [IMF (2015)…], that prescribe a similar fiscal tightening if the benchmark of 
constant non-oil primary deficit as a 4.5 % share of GDP is pursued. 
Second, a pegged nominal exchange rate can create additional pressure on the econ-
omy and a bigger need for fiscal tightening. Thus, local currency depreciation or a shift 
towards floating exchange rate is desirable as has been argued by Ramirez Rigo, the IMF 
Mission Chief for the annual Article IV Review of Russia, who appreciates the transition 
made by monetary authorities in Russia towards a floating exchange rate and inflation 
targeting5. For the comparison it is worth to mention that Kazakhstan is also declared the 
transition to floating exchange rate rather than pegged one. 
Goldberg and Knetter [1997] define ERPT as the sensitivity of local currency import 
prices to changes in the exchange rate between exporting and importing countries, i. e., 
by how much %-points a 1 %-point change in the exchange rate affects the local currency 
price of imported good. For emerging economies, like Russia, the ERPT is higher than in 
advanced economies and varies over time [IMF(2015)…]. Hence, monetary authorities 
should take into account the influence that changes in the exchange rate via pass-through 
may have on inflation and how they can exacerbate inflation’s growth. 
Third, Russia’s financial sector is relatively deep, accessible and efficient, but finan-
cial institutions (especially banks) can be improved [IMF(2015)…]. Developing financial 
institutions through centralization, liquidation of ineffective banks and promoting pos-
sibilities for small and medium-sized enterprises to be better catered for by large banks 
can potentially yield up to an additional 1 %-point in Russia’s GDP growth [Sahay, 2015].
Fourth, development of the non-oil and -gas sectors and diversification away from oil 
and gas are needed [Husain et al., 2015]. Development of the financial sector with prudent 
monetary policies enables growth of the non-oil and –gas sectors of the economy, which 
can yield a substantial boost to non-oil fiscal revenues. Nekipelov [2015] also argued that 
authorities should also pay attention to the importance of building an effective mechanism 
or resource revenue usage for achieving the strategic priority of modernization of Russian 
economy. Possible directions of diversification and modernization in Russian economy 
are considered further in section 4.3.
4.3. Russia’s need to diversify and develop non-gas sectors of the economy
The need to develop non-gas sectors of Russian economy is in line with the critique 
in section 3  about applying the permanent income rule to developing countries due 
to capital scarcity and absorption constraints. Making investments in a few sectors, 
combined with significant oil, gas or mineral bonanzas can lead to high volatility and 
unstable business environments, especially in the case of developing countries. Possible 
ways for Russia to develop its non-resource sectors of the economy are the subject of 
5 Rigo R., Habermeier K. Russia: Adjusting to Lower Oil Prices. What is staff  advice on monetary and 
fi scal policy? International Monetary Fund Survey 2016, Washington D. C. URL: https://www.imf.org/en/
News/Articles/2016/07/13/13/05/NA071316-Russia-Adjusting-to-Lower-Oil-Prices (accessed: 09.01.2017).
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debate in the academic literature and business press (e. g., [Atnashev, 2016; Taganov, 
2016]). What is needed to avoid the resource curse and boost growth and development 
is to diversify the Russian economy away from gas and oil. Previous literature suggests 
that diversification can yield the following benefits. First, diversification limits so-called 
boom and bust cycles and can act as a buffer against commodity price volatility. Second, 
diversification can boost human capital and thus help in dealing with poor education 
and health systems as well as the overall infrastructural environment. Direct benefits 
from this will also aid the extraction industries since it would help them to make a shift 
from being low marginal primary exporters to high marginal industrial exporters. Other 
benefits of diversification are the building of institutional capital and raising international 
investment attractiveness. Diversification and adequate fiscal policy can, in the long run, 
lead the economy and institutional environment to the level where oil and gas revenues 
can be fruitfully absorbed, and negative impact on the economy can be avoided. Since 
the late 2000s, Russian authorities routinely stated the necessity to diversify the economy 
away from commodities. In Russia, modernization and diversification have been an 
essential element of the economic strategy in the years of Medvedev’s Presidency6. It was 
the period when Russia was trying its best to increase its investment attractiveness and 
become recognized as a developed country. During that time Russia was ready to take 
advantage of opportunities, including funding for investments in infrastructure, human 
capital, institutions. 
It is not clear how to measure the level of diversification and the effectiveness of 
policies designed to its achievement (e. g., [Alsharif et al., 2016]). Measuring GDP and its 
growth have traditionally been one of the primary ways to assess the underlying quality and 
progress of the economy. However, this indicator does not allow one to evaluate the needed 
versatility for the development of the economy. The concept of diversification is closely 
linked with the notion of economic complexity since the diversification of a country can 
be considered as the number of different products a country is able to make [Hausmann 
et al., 2011]. Measuring the economic complexity of an economy provides a more accurate 
and detailed look at how improvements in institutions directly affect numerous industries 
and can be a better barometer for the health of a developing, resource-rich economy. 
Although there is a correlation between GDP growth and the increase in economic 
complexity, the dependence is one-sided: increases in economic complexity boost 
GDP. Specializing in simple technologies can not result in the sustainable growth and 
development. This observation highlights the plight of oil- and gas-rich developing 
economies, whose oil and gas sectors are not only geographically separated from much 
of the rest of the country but also economically segmented from much of the rest of 
the economy. Specializing in the capabilities needed for oil and gas is not helpful for 
diversification since the non-oil and non-gas sector require different capabilities.
Although recognizing the importance of economic complexity as an indicator, there 
is no unified measure used by the academic community, the OECD, World Bank or other 
international organizations. The most cited research in this area is the joint project of 
Harvard and MIT named The Atlas of Economic Complexity [Hausmann et al., 2011]. The 
authors use data from more than 100 countries and estimate the Economic Complexity 
6 URL: http://www.vedomosti.ru/library/news/2009/06/03/dmedvedev-zadacha-diversifi kacii-yavly-
aetsya-vazhnejshej (accessed: 09.01.2017).
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Index (ECI) based on the statistics of international trade (the data is transparent, and the 
classification is multipurpose). 
Products with a competitive advantage and that are exported from the country 
more than are exported from the normal country are analysed. The ECI measures how 
sophisticated the goods that are produced by a country are. Analysis of data analysis 
during the last half-century has enabled scientists to elaborate the map of the technological 
span. This shows the technological relation between various products. The economy of a 
particular country develops naturally near existing technologies, gradually domesticating 
adjacent technical spans. 
The leaps between existing technologies and points that are far away are too risky 
and rarely lead to success. For example, the ECI for Germany is 1.92 (the second highest 
in the world), and the ECI for Cambodia is — 0.65 whose economy is wholly based on 
light industry. The ECI for Russia is a disappointing 0.05. This puts the Russian economy 
in technological space in the 98th place out of 121  in the world [Atnashev, 2016]. The 
most developed sectors of Russian economics are the oil and gas sectors. After that, come 
in terms of development coal, metals, agriculture and weaponry. Aviation, shipbuilding 
and IT cannot be recognized relative to other countries, so the idea of the leap towards 
innovative and technological economics is hardly plausible. Russian possibilities are 
smudged along the peripheral sides of the technical span, competitive advantage in central 
positions are absent. This is the key challenge for Russia. 
The methodology suggested by the authors of The Atlas of Economic Complexity 
has been criticized for the excessive intricacies of the calculations and for considering 
only the export of goods and ignoring services. It has also been criticized for assessing the 
complexity of the economy solely on the export component and not taking into account the 
internal market and structural difference between developed and developing economies. 
The majority of emerging economies are very unbalanced based on the provided index; 
however, the index value does not mean that nothing besides several groups of goods is 
produced in these countries, it just means only a few types of products could be exported 
to other nations with economic profit. These critiques of the ECI imply that use of the ECI 
can result in inappropriate recommendations. 
Based on ECI research [Hausmann et al., 2011] Yudaeva and Yasin [2008] state that 
“organic” diversification of the Russian economy may be quite tough. The authors suggest 
establishing governmental institutions that will support companies attempts to invest-
ment in sectors where in the future it will be possible to carry out “organic” diversification. 
Such investments involve greater risk and investments would not be made without prop-
er incentives. These recommendations were completely consistent with the government 
plans to diversify the economy during Medvedev’s Presidency. However, unable to achieve 
outstanding results in diversification even after launching high-technology oriented proj-
ects like Skolkovo and establishing institutions like Commission for Modernization and 
Technological Development of Russian Economy, the country’s authorities had to admit 
that results had been quite average.
A different view on diversification of the Russian economy based on ECI analysis 
was presented in [Atnashev, 2016]. The author suggests that the attempt to develop ship-
building, aviation, transportation machinery and electronics simultaneously is not very 
promising. The current technological situation in Russia is fragile. Resources — capital 
and labor — are scarce while relying on the domestic market and public companies cannot 
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lead to competitive output. According to Atnashev [2016], the best development potential 
occurs in mining, chemistry, agriculture, construction materials and transportation and 
agricultural machinery. 
Forced to adjust the directions for economic diversification on non-extractive sec-
tors initially focused on high technology by the trial and error method government came 
to similar conclusions. Despite the significant drop in commodity prices and increasing 
problematic nature of the international situation, the interest in diversification was 
supported on completely different grounds. Diversification started was considered not 
only as a valuable mechanism for economic development and improvement of investment 
attractiveness, but also became a part of the updated Russian National Security Strategy 
until 20207. The need to diversify the economy, overcome its raw material orientation, 
and emphasize the transition to a new level of technological development led to the start 
of rational import substitution. The current trend of diversification and modernization 
is driven by the military-industrial complex as well as by agriculture and other industries 
that are considered essential in case of further aggravation of the international situation. 
The declared priorities for economic development are much more correlated with the 
recommendation obtained by applying the economic complexity approach discussed 
above. 
Economic diversification based on the implementation of the national security 
strategy and focusing primarily on the domestic market will not result in a significant 
increase in the ECI for the reasons discussed above. This leads to the tough question of 
whether this type of diversification is not sustainable and whether it is beneficial in the long 
run, or whether it is doomed to fail. This deserves further discussion and investigation in 
the academic community as well as among politicians and people in business.
Conclusions
Although the substantial volatility of commodity prices, underdeveloped financial 
markets, absorption constraints and Ricardian debt non-neutrality require departures 
from the permanent income rule, as a first shot is may not be bad to use the permanent 
income rule for Russia. Saving oil and gas revenue and letting the contribution of the fund 
to general government budget grow has the trend rate of technical progress introduces 
calm and stability in the government finances. Furthermore, it has the considerable benefit 
of curbing volatility of the real exchange rate and avoiding potential Dutch disease effects. 
Big swings in the fortunes of the traded and non-traded sectors are thus avoided, which 
is good for long-term economic growth and development. Russia has, unfortunately, 
abandoned sound management of its oil and gas revenues and needs to do much more to 
diversify away from oil and gas. The growth and development of the Russian economy is in 
the long run not going to come from the oil and gas sectors, since they are geographic and 
economic enclaves. The much-needed diversification is a daunting task, since much of the 
complexity that is needed to realize non-oil and non-gas paths of growth and development 
lack in the Russian economy. The approach based on import substitution are likely to fail, 
since they do not contribute to developing those sectors of the economy in which Russia 
has a clear comparative advantage on a global scale.
7 URL: https://rg.ru/2015/12/22/patrushev-site.html (accessed: 09.01.2017).
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